11. In support of his intervention, Sh. P.P Rao, the learned senior advisor, relied on Budhan Choudhary, Bihar State; 1955 1 SCR 1045, Rashbehari Panda v. Orissa State; (1969) 1 SCC 414, Erusian Equipment – Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal; 1975) 1 CSC 70, Union of India v. N.S. Ratnam; (2015) 10 SCC 681 and John Vallamattom v. Union of India; (2003) 6 CCS 611. In Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel – Co.
v. Union of India [AIR 1962 SC 1006], it says: ” (AIR S. 1021, para. 37) Subject to the above and applicable law, JVC supports/provides aeronautical and essential services on the airport site. JVC may attempt to provide/provide non-aeronautical services on the airport site by incorporating them into the proposed master plan (project), but if the same part is part of the (final) master plan to be implemented in accordance with this agreement. JVC and AAI update, by mutual agreement between the parties, the list of non-aeronautical services to include other activities, as requested by the IAAs or JVC. 15. The prestigious ASG also argues that the petitioner who, following the removal of Schedule 19 of the tendering conditions, led to the limitation of JVC`s right to the provision of air services below the overall limit of 5% of leased land, could not, after the removal of Schedule 19 of the terms of the tender, assert hostile discrimination and could not legitimately trust the advantageous regime of future aviation policies with respect to its agreements concluded. In support of this method, ASG was formed on the basis of Joshi Technologies International Inc. v.
Union of India; (2015) 7 SCC 728. “72. The assertion that DIAL would not also be bound by the obligations of the IAA establishment would again have absurd consequences. In the contested judgment, the division rightly stated that “every time a new agreement is reached, the whole process of concern must be repeated by the competent government regarding the same trolley pickup work and with the same agency with regard to such a private actor.” This interpretation would ner and void the rights of workers who are supposed to be protected by clraa. The divisional bank correctly pointed out that the obligation arising from the section 10, paragraph 1, clraa, registration continues to engage any private player who follows in the footsteps of AAI. 13. Shri Parag P. Tripathi, the senior qualified adviser, in addition to Shri P.P Rao`s statements, stated that discrimination between two categories of persons could only be done by law alone and not by simple executive measures. While the Qualified Senior Counsel argues that NCAP 2016 is neither a law nor a delegated legislation under Section 40 of the 1994 IAA Act, the experienced Senior Counsel argues that the disputed classification between existing and future P3 airports, which is drawn on the basis of NCAP and is nothing more than an exercise in executive action, is legally inadmissible and untenable. To under-exploit this model, senior counsel was based on N.K Bajpai v.
Union of India; (2012) 4 SCC 653 and Deokinandan Prasad v. State of Bihar; (1971) 2 SCC 330. The other complaint of the experienced Senior Counsel is that in 2016, the NCAP, which amounts to depriving the petitioner of the right to his property without legal authority, violates Article 300-A of the Indian Constitution.